recent attempts to execute such approaches have provided neither the integrated efforts envisioned nor the desired results. 7 This paper will investigate challenges in the current system of identifying and responding to potential future failing states, highlight possible opportunities, and make recommendations to improve the current efforts in this vital endeavor. It will discuss the elements of national power and how they are used, underscore the differences between WoG and Comprehensive approaches to national strategy, and provide recommendations for improvements to current efforts to engage the VUCA problems caused by failing states.
Challenges of Failing States
Over the last ten years, the United States and its allies have been concentrating their attention and resources on nation-states in crisis such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and Haiti, while little attention has been paid to future failing states-relatively stable nation-states that are in danger of becoming failed states but
have not yet crossed the crisis threshold into failed state status. In recognizing this threat, President Barack Obama issued National Security Presidential Directive Forty Four (NSPD 44) to direct USG efforts to stabilize countries at risk of civil strife. 8 While the bulk of national resources committed to failed states has been the military arm of national power for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT), there has been recurring calls for efforts to head off problems before they occur as insurgents have become adept at moving their operations into failing nation-states where there is less chance of government interference with their global operations.
But the ability to provide international support for failing nation-states is hampered by the absence of well-defined terminology, methodologies for determining nations in danger of becoming failing states, unity of command and effort, and a proven process for accomplishing successful preemptive interventions. The following sections will discuss each of these challenges in detail.
Defining Failing States. As previously stated, there is no single definition for what constitutes a failing state. 9 Each agency or organization has its own definitions and terminology, but these definitions are not generally accepted and have not proven their efficacy. Although the National Security Strategy recognized that "failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security," it does not define the term. 10 NSPD-44, as previously stated, sets the policy that the USG will assist in stabilizing countries at risk of civil strife, but does not define them as failing states. 11 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism used the term failing states, indicating states incapable of ensuring national sovereignty, but does not define the term. 12 The National Intelligence Council (NIC) defined failing and failed states as those "with expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective governmental control."
13 DOS used the term fragile states as those "unable to provide physical security and basic services for their citizens due to lack of control over physical territory, massive corruption, criminal capture of government institutions, feudal gaps between rich and poor, an absence of social responsibility by elites, or simply grinding poverty and the absence of any tradition of functioning government." 14 USAID defined fragile states as including failed, failing, and recovering states. 15 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) defined failing states as "nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security." 16 The National Defense Strategy does not mention failing states, but declared that "the inability of many states to police themselves effectively or work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international community." 17 The National Military Strategy also does not mention failing states, but recognized that "adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks," and discusses stability operations. 18 The Department of Defense instruction on stability operations does not mention failing states, but set stability operations as a core mission for the U. But in actual operation, unity of command in R&S operations is, at best, a significant challenge. This is due, in part, to 1) the complexity of interagency and international cooperation, 2) cultural, organizational, procedural, and capacity differences between USG civilian agencies and the military and 3) lack of resources and authority by S/CRS and other USG agencies. 40 In his recent book, Donald Rumsfeld discussed the R&S efforts in Iraq and stated: "the muddied lines of authority meant there was no single individual in control or responsible …There were far too many hands on the wheel, which, in my view, was a formula for running the truck into the ditch." 41 A 2007 GAO report found "guidance on roles and responsibilities for State"s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent." 42 Despite significant steps taken by DOS in response to these criticisms, Unity of command continues to be a significant challenge when dealing with large interagency efforts.
Unity of Effort. 43 Unity of effort is critical to achieving success in operations requiring multiple elements of national power. 44 Unity of effort is defined as "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. 45 In order to have unity of effort, it is essential to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the various activities of the myriad of actors including USG, international partners, host nation, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO), and corporate entities to affect a desired outcome.
In reality, although there has been much effort to implement R&S frameworks, unity of effort has not yet been achieved across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of government. At the strategic and operational levels, some USG interagency partners have voiced concerns about the cumbersome planning process, and resource constraints for operations that are not part of their core missions or current budgets. 46 Although the challenges at the tactical level are more confined and should be easier to coordinate due to the unity of command provided by the Chief of Mission in each country, there are still gaps in providing unity of effort due to unclear guidance, roles, and authorities for the multitude of USG entities conducting field operations. 47 Current R&S Process. The general principles and current R&S process were approved by the NSC in 2008. 48 In the framework, planning for conflict transformation is divided into crisis response planning and long-term contingency response planning. As the name indicates, crisis planning can occur whenever a global crisis occurs and is ad hoc in nature as circumstances dictate. Deliberate long-term scenario-based planning is intended to provide contingency planning and recommendations for preventative actions that should be incorporated into agency strategic planning. 49 The established R&S planning cycle includes the phases: situation analysis, policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation planning. 50 This process is intended to be iterative and flexible as the environment or situational awareness evolves, and has an integrated monitoring function to provide necessary feedback, identify new challenges, and highlight windows of opportunity. The strategic planning team includes all relevant USG agencies, Combatant Command representatives, the State Regional Assistant (SRA), and the COM to ensure a WoG approach to identified issues.
Guidance for triggering the R&S process was approved by the NSC in 2007.
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The guidance delineates the difference between long-term scenario based planning for conflict prevention and crises response planning. Long-term planning is triggered via a request from the COM or Regional Assistant Secretary (RAS) to the R&S Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). The proposal is reviewed based on established criteria including: importance, magnitude, potential for U.S. involvement, likelihood, and capacity. 52 The PCC holds a semi-annual planning guidance meeting to prioritize WoG missions based on the NIC ISW and COM proposals. Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and has been used in conflict prevention, contingency planning, and crisis response planning in multiple countries. 54 The steps of the ICAF include: evaluate context; understand grievances; identify drivers of conflict; and describing opportunities for decreasing conflict. 55 The output of the ICAF assessment is fed into the USG planning process at the relevant departments, agencies, embassies, and Combatant Commanders.
While much progress has been made in creating a process to ensure unity of effort in WoG responses to failing states, the process is still maturing and has numerous critics. Challenges include: an organizational cultural shift from diplomacy to a production paradigm at DOS; 56 whether DOS has sufficient authority and resources to execute the process; 57 the R&S process is untested and may be infeasible; 58 and USG interagency concerns about the cumbersome planning process and resource constraints. 59 There is also an organizational bias towards crisis management, with lesser efforts in contingency planning and conflict prevention.
Strategies for Engaging Future Failing States
Once a future failing state has been recognized, the next challenges include determining a strategy for responding to the issues identified. A strategy should include how an entity uses its power to affect desired changes. 60 The U.S. Army War College model of strategy development includes identifying the ends (objectives), means (resources), and ways (courses of action) available to affect a desired change. 61 In the case of national strategy, this includes identifying the elements of national of power than can be brought to bear (means), and the approaches to applying these elements (ways), in order to affect the desired end of helping future failing states in moving towards stability (ends). The following sections will describe the elements of national power, discuss the current approaches to applying those elements, provide a Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability (FAS) analysis of each approach in dealing with future failing states, and also provide a risk analysis.
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Means of Engaging Future Failing States. The means of a strategy define the resources available to meet the desired ends. 63 The elements of national power are the resources available for use in dealing with future failing states. 64 National power is the ability of a nation-state to influence global events. 65 Joint Publication 1-02 defines the elements of national power as the means available to be utilized in meeting national objectives. 66 The recognized elements of national power have evolved over time as the global environment emerged from the medieval period into the periods of statetism, mercantilism, industrialism, the information age, and now into the knowledge age.
In response to the changing global environment, several models of national power have emerged over time. The Joint Doctrine Model identifies the elements of national power as "diplomatic, economic, informational, and military." 67 The U.S. Army
War College Model recognizes Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME)
as the prime elements, but also sometimes, arguably, includes Financial, Intelligence, and Legal (DIMEFIL). 68 According to DOD"s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):
America"s enduring effort to advance common interests without resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. 69 The National Security Strategy model includes Defense, Diplomacy, Development, Economic, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Strategic Communication, and the American People and Private Sector. 70 What each of these models highlights is the growing list of possible elements of national power available for dealing with future failing states and other VUCA problems of the twenty first century.
Ways of Engaging Future Failing
States. The ways of a strategy are used to explain how the organization will execute the plan in order to meet the desired ends.
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There are numerous ways of strategically combining the elements of national power to meet the stated end of successfully engaging future failing states. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
professed that "converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership." 72 National power resources can be combined and utilized in different ways to deter, coerce, induce, influence, co-opt, and attract others to perform in ways to reach the desired ends. Using an analogy of playing poker, the elements of national power are like the player"s cards; having a winning hand does not always guaranty a win, whereas skillful playing increases the likelihood of winning. 73 The following paragraphs discuss Smart The risks associated with smart power include the cost of global engagement with the possibility of strategic overreach while trying to be everything to everyone.
There is the risk of assuming that Smart Power will replace hard power or soft power, but it is dependent on credible hard power for relevancy and soft power for attraction in nation-state relations. interests. Large scale comprehensive efforts require time to develop, which may preclude their use in near-term crises. There is also the risk of assuming that TwentyFirst Century Statecraft will replace smart power, but it is dependent on smart power to provide continued nation-state relations.
Analysis and Recommendations
In light of the above discussions, the following recommendations should be considered.
First and foremost, the lack of a well-defined and universally accepted terminology for describing future failing states hampers the ability of USG departments, agencies, international allies, and NGOs to effectively collaborate in responding to the threat of failing nation-states. Without a shared vocabulary, the ability to objectively describe the phenomenon, develop effective strategies, and discuss lessons learned becomes more difficult. It also hampers international efforts by restricting the ability to design holistic conflict prevention strategies, establish norms, and develop procedures that can be objectively measured for effectiveness. 85 This paper recommends development of overarching governance documents for USG R&S definitions, terminology, and concepts. This should be similar in scope and content to the Joint Publications series provided to the military forces. USG departments, agencies, and institutes would be required to change their current documentation to match the governance specified definitions and terminology.
Second, the lack of real-time, highly-accurate, predictive analytics hampers the ability of the USG to quickly and reliably identify nation-states in danger of becoming failing states. This is evident by looking at each of the indices and noting that none accurately predicted current events in the middle-east. Recent media reports indicate that although $125 million has been spent by the USG on predictive analytic models over the last three years, there was little success in providing early warning of current political unrest. 86 Without some form of early warning, the ability to provide useful contingency planning is hampered.
This paper recommends development of highly accurate real-time predictive analytics models. Although this has been a USG goal for many years, this project should be given a higher priority. Recommend issuing an industry challenge similar to the DARPA Urban Challenge for autonomous vehicles, analogous to the industry practice of crowd-sourcing which has provided unexpected dividends in the research world. The focus should be on providing foresight for anticipatory contingency planning in a range of possible scenarios for development of pre-planned responses. 87 Third, there is a bias towards crisis management over contingency planning for future failing states. While the S/CRS office is tasked to monitor "political and economic stability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the reconstruction and stabilization of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or are in transition from conflict or civil strife," 88 Lastly, R&S organizations, processes, literature, and proposed remedies are based on the Westphalian view of diplomacy with bilateral relations between stable nation-states. While this strategy has worked well to provide global stability since WWII, it remains to be seen whether it is sufficient to deal with evolving threats such as transnational dark networks and future failing nation-states where tribal governance is the norm. In the twenty first century, many nation-state boundaries created by colonialism are not recognized by the indigenous tribal groups, trans-national corporations and dark networks work across global boundaries to gain economic and political power, and hyper-empowered individuals are unbounded by Westphalian constraints. 94 In these instances, the strategy of trying to build government stability via bilateral agreements may be problematic.
This paper recommends using a holistic approach 95 for dealing with the twenty first century VUCA problems. Rather than trying to solve all problems simultaneously using WoG or Comprehensive approaches in a limited resource environment, determine the key relationship that could provide the tipping point between stability and chaos, and concentrate efforts on that variable. 96 An example of this theory in practice was presented by Eric Berlow at the TEDGlobal 2010 conference. 97 In his analysis of COIN operations in Afghanistan, Barlow used a complexity diagram to highlight the key nodes as "engagement with ethnic rivalries and religious beliefs" and "fair transparent economic development". 98 Using the holistic approach, concentration of efforts in these key areas could flip the failing state status of a nation-state.
Conclusion
As the United States prepares to face the VUCA problems of the twenty first century, the ability to accurately predict and prepare to face the challenges of future failing states is imperative. Although the USG has attempted to integrate the appropriate elements of national power utilizing WoG and Comprehensive approaches to increase global stability, the efficacy of these approaches have, as yet, remained unrealized. The growing global issues of economic disparity, overpopulation, food security, health services availability, migration pressures, environmental degradation, personal and community issues, and diffusion of political power requires a new look at how the USG and partners provide for that global stability. 99 Recognizing the need for transformation, DOS produced the first QDDR in 2010 which identifies fundamental changes in management approach to better provide unity of command and unity of effort. 100 It calls for increased Talent Management by prioritizing interagency experience in recruitment, and increased training for Chiefs of Mission. It also calls for increased empowerment for Chiefs of Mission to act as Chief
Executive Officers (Unity of command) and be held accountable for results. 101 These changes, as well as others highlighted in the QDDR, will build on the progress already being made in the USG ability to aggressively respond to future failing states.
But there is a growing need for a proven strategy to identify future failing states and provide contingency planning and anticipatory assistance before crisis occurs. As stated in the QDDR: "by deploying integrated teams of experienced mediators, negotiators, and early-responders that draw not only from State but also USAID, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Government can help to prevent armed conflict from breaking out and reduce the likelihood that the United States or other forces will be required."
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The challenges to this approach including lack of common definitions, lack of real-time predictive analytics, and organizational cultural barriers to contingency planning, need to be overcome in order to realize success in this vital endeavor.
Utilization of the recommendations presented in this paper, including a holistic approach and Twenty-First Century elements of national power, may provide the opportunity to diminish the threat of future failing states before crisis occurs, and allow the USG to successfully manage the VUCA challenges of the twenty first century. 6 FM 3-07 defines a WoG approach as "an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." A successful WoG approach is very challenging because of the differing civilian organizational cultures and biases involved. A WoG approach requires that all participants: are represented and actively involved in the process; have a shared understanding of the desired ends; and collaboratively share resources and capabilities to achieve those ends. rebuilding alliances, partnerships, and institutions that are the foundations for dealing with global challenges; increasing global development to decrease inequities between nations and regions; improving public diplomacy by increasing access to information, knowledge, and learning; Increasing economic integration and free trade with and for all; and increasing innovation and the use of technology to help solve global problems such as climate change and energy insecurity. The means of achieving smart power is to develop an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to effectively utilize hard and soft power. To do this, the United States must maintain a strong and relevant military, invest heavily in diplomacy and aid, but also increase participation in international alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels. 75 Soft power is the ability to exert national power through co-option and the promotion of the legitimacy of U.S. policies. Joseph S. Nye states "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others." The intended ends of soft power are to engender cooperation by convincing allies and adversaries of the justness of U.S. interests, values, culture, policies, and institutions. The ways to execute soft power include utilizing diplomacy and strategic communications to sell the U.S. "brand", and providing foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development aid to promote the common good. The means of soft power includes: leading by example and attracting others to do what you want; promoting intangible assets such as ethical behavior; and promoting policies that are seen as having moral authority. The utilization of the elements of national power to attract is helpful when dealing with emerging democracies and future failing states. Although theoretically feasible, the use of soft power has not demonstrated the ability to meet the intended ends as world opinion about the United States has turned more negative since implementation. The concept of soft power is acceptable to the United States and international public, since it relies on ethical values and behaviors. While skeptics claim that popularity should not guide foreign policy, soft power has not been shown to be suitable in changing some attitudes about U.S. foreign policy, and has few measurable successes. The risks associated with soft power include the need to retain the ability to act unilaterally in support of U.S. national interests-no matter what world opinion says. Soft power is also of little use in dealing with ideologues such as dictators, insurgents, and terrorists, in that they will never be convinced of the righteousness of U.S. policies. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, and Soft Power critic stated: "Dialog and cooperation with repressive governments is too often an excuse for doing nothing about Human Rights." In some cultures, reliance on soft power is a sign of weakness, which can lead to severe unintended consequences. Over-reliance on soft power alone can also lead to the mistaken belief that hard power is no longer necessary or valid. 76 Hard power is the ability to exert national power through coercive means and has been a mainstay of U.S. national security since the mid-twentieth century. According to Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, "hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want." The elements of hard power include: building and maintaining a large and capable military in all domains including air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace for coercion, deterrence, and protection; the use of coercive diplomacy; and the reliance on economic aid and sanctions to influence allies and adversaries. Hard power methods include using DIMEFIL to influence the behavior or interests of other nations or states through threats, rewards, or a combination of the two. Hard power means can be used to defeat, coerce, deter, dissuade, or compel adversaries, and to reassure allies. The utilization of the instruments of national power to coerce, compel, reassure, deter, dissuade, or defeat is necessary when dealing with despots, insurgencies, and mass atrocities. But the feasibility of maintaining a large standing military and providing massive foreign aid will be challenged in the near future with the requirement for U.S. deficit reduction. Hard power has been acceptable to the USG and public since the end of the cold war, but faces growing dissatisfaction in global circles, especially when dealing with future failing states. The suitability of hard power has been demonstrated in achieving military objectives, but has not demonstrated consistent adequacy in meeting long-term political objectives. There are numerous risks associated with the use of hard power. Although in appropriate circumstances-such as foreign aggression-the use of credible and effective hard power is required, the over-reliance on these solutions leads to a reduction in overall national power as world opinion turns negative to U.S. actions. The maintenance of an overwhelming military capability and providing diplomacy and foreign aid is resource intensive and can drain assets from other national priorities such as domestic programs. The apparent and measurable success of hard power can lead to mission creep, where non-military functions are incrementally assigned to the military, reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of appropriate military missions. 81 The Twenty-First Century Statecraft approach is based on opportunities for continued U.S. global leadership in the emerging century. Twenty-First Century Statecraft ends are realized through a reliance on smart power to deal with the current global power transition and traditional nation-state issues, but also leverages the power of diffusion to deal with global problems. The ways of achieving Twenty-First Century Statecraft include: creating a national talent management effort to attract and retain the world"s best and brightest; becoming a center of organizational transformation to increase agility, innovation, and experimentation; maintaining the global commons for DIMEFIL; becoming the network connectivity crossroads of the world; collaborating by, with, and through allies and host nations for dealing with dark networks; and becoming the trusted agent in global diplomatic, information, economic, and financial markets. The means of achieving Twenty-First Century Statecraft will require an integrated comprehensive USG effort, reorganization on the national strategic level to support twenty first century concepts, and building national leadership focused on a strategic view rather than just current issues and crisis management. It will require building national capacity to leverage the knowledge age processes, technologies, and networks for the common good, while learning to defeat the dark networks and rogue actors through collaborative global efforts.
82 FM 3-07 defines the Comprehensive approach as: "an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." Comprehensive Approaches are extremely challenging because of the differing organizational cultures and biases inherent in working with foreign governments, international organizations, transnational super-empowered individuals, and NGOs. It requires that all participants: are accommodated; have a shared understanding of the situation; are
